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I am honoured to be your Sibley lecturer. I chose the theme of
the role of the Security Council in world affairs without knowing
who would be in the audience. I now feel somewhat intimidated by
the presence of Louis Sohn who was one of the drafters of the United
Nations Charter over 40 years ago. I deeply respect his wisdom and
experience. Beside him I am a mere practitioner. I walk delicately
before him.
The Security Council is a unique institution whose purpose is simply
put: the maintenance of international peace and security. Naturally,
its past and future have to be seen within the framework of the
United Nations as a whole. Both the United Nations and the Security
Council within it are living bodies, and like all such respond to new
circumstances and advance in constant evolution.
The United Nations was set up at the end of the Second World
War. Its founders were anxious to avoid not only another such
catastrophe but also the mistakes which had led to the failure of the
League of Nations. The drafters of the Charter reflected the conditions
of the immediate post war world. They worked on assumptions, some
of which proved right and others wrong. For example, they assumed
the continuation of the wartime alliance. They assumed that five
Permanent Members of the Security Council could act as world
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policemen with real powers. They assumed that the one-man-one-
vote system in the General Assembly was fundamental to political
success. They assumed that the so-called enemy states - Germany,
Japan, and Italy - must be excluded from the United Nations.
It soon became clear that things would not work out in the way
that everyone had hoped. Wartime cooperation among the allies broke
down into the Cold War. Far from being a forum in which they
could cooperate in coping with post war problems, the United Nations,
and the Security Council in particular, became a battleground between
East and West in which the West faced seemingly endless vetoes from
the Soviet Union. By 1968 when the Soviet Union vetoed a resolution
which would have condemned its invasion of Czechoslovakia, they
had used the veto no fewer than 100 times. This East/West rivalry
polarized and paralyzed international activity, most acutely before
the death of Stalin. The sole, aberrant, exception was over the Korean
War when the Soviet Union made the fatal mistake of absenting itself
from the Security Council, thus allowing the West to put together
an intervention force to fight on South Korea's behalf. This is the
only example of the Security Council acting with military force in a
way envisaged in the Charter.
In the second period in the history of the United Nations, there
was a swing from East/West polarity to North/South polarity. Of
course there was no fixed time at which one period ended and the
other began. But during the 1950s and 1960s the old colonial empires
ended, with the result that the membership of the United Nations
greatly increased (from 51 in 1946 to 159 today).
This had two consequences. First, the newly independent countries
wanted a different distribution of global power and resources. They
had their own distinct priorities. They concentrated on economic
issues and worked out demands for a new world economic order.
This naive and fanciful notion is not totally dead even now. So long
as material and human resources are unevenly divided, so will be the
distribution of the world's goods. Expectations of what the United
Nations could achieve then - as now - exceeded reality.
Secondly, with the increase in members, the character of the sub-
sidiary bodies of the United Nations, including the Security Council,
changed. The Security Council was expanded from 11 to 15 members
in 1963. This meant that, together with the five vetoes of the Per-
manent Members, in practice a sixth veto was added: that of the
non-aligned movement which usually holds seven seats on the Council,
sufficient to block any resolution (which requires nine affirmative
votes). The focus of the business of the Council began to shift from
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East/West issues to issues of interest to the non-aligned: South Africa,
Namibia, the Middle East, and Cyprus. The use of the veto also
began to shift. We and the Americans cast more vetoes than before,
and the Russians fewer. Incidentally, the Chinese have cast only two
vetoes since the People's Republic took the Chinese seat in 1971.
One of my distinguished predecessors once said that casting a veto
was like adultery: the first time it gave a wicked thrill; but all too
soon it became habitual.
The third phase of the United Nations began in the 1980s and has
continued until now. It has been a time of growing realism with
good and bad aspects. Among the good aspects there has been better
understanding, particularly by the poorer countries, that some of the
theories of the 1960s and 1970s did not fit. We are all witnesses of
the crumbling edifice of Marxism. I am also skeptical about the neo-
capitalist ideas around at the time. Not everyone can take off into
industrial prosperity, however much he would like to do so. Economic
and political development - change for the better - came to be seen
as elusive and related to the fundamental realities of the resources
of each country and region. It became clear that neither rhetoric,
nor paper resolutions, nor the overwhelming majorities that the poorer
countries could command in the General Assembly, would in them-
selves change anything. Indeed, they tended to discredit the Assembly.
People began to see the advantages of cooperation over confrontation.
There was also growing realization of the precarious character of the
world's environment with increasing pollution of land, sea, and air.
There were bad aspects too. The atmosphere was soured by the
polemics of earlier years. Cynicism about multilateral institutions and
about the United Nations in particular grew, especially among the
industrial countries. A number of countries, including the United
States, were tempted by go-it-alone policies. The General Assembly
and the Security Council looked in many ways irrelevant. Council
resolutions had little if any practical effect, while many UN agencies
and programmes seemed a waste of money. Important ventures such
as the Law of the Sea conference were flawed. Meanwhile, the
multilateral institutions which seemed to work best were those which
were regional in character and scope (like the European Community),
or based on voluntary subscriptions (like the United Nations Devel-
opment Program and the other voluntary funds), or recognized the
realities through use of weighted voting (like the International Mon-
etary Fund and the World Bank).
The years 1987 and 1988 saw a change of sentiment and direction.
Three factors stand out. There has been wider acceptance of the need
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for global solutions to global problems. The Brundtland Commission
report on the environment and development, and the Montreal Pro-
tocol on the ozone layer are outstanding examples of cooperation on
the environment. The response of the United Nations to the AIDS
pandemic, principally through the efforts of the World Health Or-
ganisation, was another example of the ability of the United Nations
to tackle problems which transcend national frontiers. In the last
General Assembly I spoke on the problems of likely global warming.
Little had I ever imagined that my work on the subject at Harvard
and since could have led to this result.
The second factor was a greater readiness to abandon confrontation
for cooperation. Much of the rhetoric of the 1970s can now be seen
for what it was, and a more cooperative approach to such issues as
debt is seen to favour results where confrontation simply leads to
deadlock.
Finally, and more specific to the United Nations, there is an
apparent readiness by one of the superpowers - the Soviet Union -
to make more use of the United Nations in its foreign policy, and
to see it as a window on the world. Until a few years ago it would
have been inconceivable for a Soviet leader to put forward the ideas
that Mikhail Gorbachev did in an article in Pravda in 1987 and
developed with such conviction in his address to the General Assembly
last month; for the Soviet Union to pay its arrears both to the main
budget and eventually to the peacekeeping account, and for the
Russians to work together with the other Permanent Members of the
Security Council on Iran/Iraq and an increasing range of the issues.
The Soviet Union has also made use of the United Nations in its
effort to withdraw from Afghanistan, an effort which led to the
signature of the Geneva Agreements. The Soviet Union continues to
put forward ideas, some new, some old, some bad, for the future
work and role of the United Nations. This new Soviet attitude has
greatly affected all UN activities, and has changed the psychological
background against which the United Nations operates.
Unfortunately, this resurgence of the United Nations has coincided
with an internal crisis at the organisation in which reform and money
are linked. The process of reform was launched at the General
Assembly in 1986, and progress has been made, notably at the end
of last year. But there is a long way to go in tackling the endemic
problems of wasted resources, overlap, personal empire building, lack
of responsiveness, and poor coordination. There is, quite simply, too
much bureaucracy and too little management. One of the main factors
impeding the reform process has been the failure of several countries,
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principally but by no means exclusively the United States, to pay
their subscriptions promptly and in full in accordance with their
obligations. It is ironic that the United States receives far more from
the United Nations (by virtue of its presence in New York) than the
US Administration pays - when it pays - in the form of its subscription.
At the end of 1988 the United Nations was owed US $395 million
on its regular budget, and 73 countries were in arrears.
The character and work of the present Security Council are a far
cry from what the drafters of the Charter intended. The original idea
was that the Five Permanent Members would be willing to act together
to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the
military provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter (in particular Ar-
ticles 42-47) supported by a Military Staff Committee of the Chiefs
of Staff of the Five whose job was supposed to be "the strategic
direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security
Council". The Council was able to use these coercive powers only
in the special circumstances of the Korean War. Since then, the
Council has had to rely on persuasion and the gentler measures set
out in Article 41: "complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other
means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations".
Parallel to this development has been another which has led the
Security Council in a direction undreamed of by the founders of the
Charter, namely peacekeeping. The present system, which has grown
up under the responsibility of the Secretary-General, is untidy. Until
recently, even the concept was opposed by the Soviet Union. But it
works, and the Russians have come to accept it (and even to promise
payment of arrears). I will discuss it in more detail later. Peacekeeping
has seen the United Nations at its best and secured it a Nobel prize.
It has also, in the Congo crisis of the early 1960s, brought the United
Nations almost to its knees. But there is no doubt that the blue berets
of the United Nations have become a part of the landscape of
international relations and a key factor in coping with some of the
more intractable regional conflicts.
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Security Council?
What has it achieved? What can it achieve in the future? Perhaps
the main strength of the Council is that there is no damned democracy
about it. The veto power of the Five Permanent Members has always
been an essential element. In saying something about the veto, I must
declare an interest. Britain has a veto and uses it when necessary.
The veto has created frustration, particularly among those who do
not possess it, and it has also pushed a number of disputes out of
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the UN framework (in particular almost anything that has an East/
West flavour).
But the veto is vital. First, the veto, paradoxically, does more than
anything else to ensure that the United Nations bears some resem-
blance to the real world and is treated seriously as an organisation.
Imagine what would happen if there were no veto. Resolutions of
mounting fatuity would be passed, instructing the Permanent Mem-
bers to do things which they had no intention of doing. Through
ignoring these resolutions, the leading countries of the world would
soon ignore the Security Council, thereby devaluing not only the
Security Council but the whole UN system.
Second, the veto ensures - Korea is again an exception - that genuine
international consensus is required before action is taken which in-
volves the international community as a whole.
Third, the permanent membership of those who exercise the veto
brings to the Council a degree of continuity which it would not
otherwise have. I add rather gently that those who sometimes criticize
the veto (many of whom come from the non-aligned movement which,
as I have suggested, exercises a sixth veto) are frequently glad enough
to shelter behind the vetoes of others.
What has the Council achieved? Among its more impressive achieve-
ments in the past were the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Iran in
1946; the sending of a peacekeeping force to Suez ten years later
which allowed the British and French troops to withdraw; and the
creation of peacekeeping forces which helped establish the ceasefire
during the Yom Kippur war of October 1973. The UN-supervised
ceasefire was an essential precursor to the subsequent peace negotia-
tions which led to the Camp David Agreement.
As the character of the United Nations has changed, so has the
role of the Security Council. As well as taking specific actions, the
Council has passed resolutions designed to establish an agreed in-
ternational framework for dealing with particular problems. The most
conspicuous examples are SCR 242 on the Middle East, SCR 435 on
Namibia, and SCR 598 on the Iran/Iraq war. Implementation of the
first is not yet on the horizon but may be closer over it than some
people think. The second is already upon us, and if there are no
upsets, Namibia should achieve its independence on 1 April. We hope
soon to proceed from a ceasefire in the Iran/Iraq war to a permanent
settlement.
Another less famous resolution is worth remembering. In November
1983, the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus purported to declare
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an independent state. The British Government, which has special
responsibilities as one of the guarantors of the Cyprus constitution,
instructed my predecessor to request an immediate meeting of the
Security Council and subsequently to table a draft resolution which,
with a few amendments, was passed overwhelmingly as SCR 541.
Our experience of this resolution helps to show how best to use the
apparatus of the Security Council, what the Council can achieve and
what it cannot.
SCR 541 underlined the importance of timely action. As a neutral
and relatively disinterested party, we took the initiative in tabling a
firm but moderate resolution. Anything tabled by the parties more
immediately involved would probably have been unacceptable, not
to say inflammatory, to the others. Our resolution was aimed at what
we believed the Council could achieve. It was sharply focussed on
the circumstances created by the unilateral declaration of independ-
ence. It sought neither to solve the Cyprus problem at a stroke, nor
to redress the wrongs - real and imagined - suffered by the two
communities at the hand of the other.
What did it achieve? It established a definitive international position
on the status of the Turkish Cypriot action. It called on all states
not to recognize the so-called independent state; and no state (with
the special exception of Turkey) has yet done so five years on. It
helped take the heat out of a potentially explosive situation and
reassure the Greek Cypriots that the international community was
taking action to deal with the problem. But we must also recognize
that the resolution, which called for the withdrawal of the declaration
of independence, failed to achieve that aim. Nor is a solution to the
Cyprus problem much nearer. In this we can see in microcosm the
limitations of the Security Council. It can set frameworks; it can
express the will of the international community; it can guide the
actions of states not immediately involved in a particular dispute; it
can help the parties to a dispute to resolve it; but it cannot solve it
for them.
I have now been British Representative on the Security Council
for almost two years. I came without previous experience. Many had
warned me to expect the worst in sterile debate, frustrating games
with words, and ambiguous results. It has not been like that at all.
Of course there have been bruising moments: for example over the
wisdom of imposing mandatory sanctions against South Africa. But
generally the spirit has been one of understanding and cooperation
between the fifteen members of what is one of the most exclusive
clubs in the world.
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There is another club within the club. The Five Permanent Members
have been working together in unprecedented fashion throughout. As
the coordinator of the group, I can testify that it is a workmanlike
body of growing weight and experience. The war between Iran and
Iraq was our first test case. Namibia has been the second. More are
to come. You may be interested to know about the way we work.
The Five Permanent Representatives meet privately, usually in my
apartment in New York, and work in an atmosphere of tea, muffins,
and sympathy. Our respective Counsellors also meet at working level,
and are responsible for much of the initial drafting. Through the
coordinator, or acting together, we maintain constant contact with
the Secretary-General, and on occasion we have coordinator action
elsewhere in the world. Throughout we work on the basis of an
identification of common interest. But personal understanding and
friendship counts for a lot - as it always does - in the conduct of
international affairs.
What will the Security Council achieve in the future? Any analysis
must be, at best, a guess. Obviously it will reflect the main trends
in international relations: all three - the global approach to global
problems, the search for cooperation and consensus, and the new
role of the Soviet Union - will, I believe, continue to hold good. I
am less sure of other points. The need for multilateral cooperation
will grow. But the ability of some countries to recognize the obvious
will remain uncertain. The interests of all will be more easily and
effectively advanced by the precision tool of persuasion rather than
by the blunt instrument of coercion. But the temptation to use the
blunter instrument will not always be resisted either by powerful
countries or by relatively weak ones. There is, therefore, a risk that
the Security Council will remain an under-used asset. Its members
and the rest of the international community must recognize both its
potential and its limitations, the value of proceeding by consensus,
and - perhaps most difficult - the difference between problems which
are susceptible to successful treatment by the Council and those which
are not.
Against this background, it is hard to sketch out a blueprint for
its future development. But I suggest four ways in which it might
more effectively carry out its business.
First, on the role of the Permanent Members, we believe in a wide
agenda. We have already moved from the Persian Gulf to Southern
Africa. Cambodia may come next. Sooner or later I hope we shall
arrive at the Middle East. Two things are necessary for success. First,
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as I have said, is an identification of common interest and political
will to construct joint policies based on it. Second is a good rela-
tionship between the Permanent and non-Permanent Members: for
while the Five can stop anything, they do not, by themselves, carry
a majority in the Security Council. You will note an important point:
the negative power of the Five has always been vital; but now we
are seeing the development of the positive power of the Five, and
that may turn out to be more important still.
Next, I believe that the Council should pay more attention to
preventive diplomacy. The Council tends to be reactive, and it may
always be. But if it is to fulfil any of the roles of an international
fire brigade, it should not just fight fires when they break out, but
also exercise some fire precautions. This would mean discovering
potential trouble spots in advance, and identifying appropriate pre-
ventive action. The pressure of current business and the lack of
resources in regional trouble spots make a systematic approach to
this idea difficult. But the Secretary-General could play an important
role, perhaps through more vigorous use of Article 99 of the Charter,
which empowers him to "bring to the attention of the Security Council
any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of
international peace and security".
There is anyway a greater role for the Secretary-General. As the
leading international civil servant, with the confidence of big powers
and small, his potentialities are enormous. The negotiations on Iran/
Iraq have brought out the importance of his relationship with the
Security Council, especially its Permanent Members. In all respects
the two have complementary roles. The Secretary-General conducts
negotiations, and the Security Council gives general direction. Both
can act independently of the other. Use of the Secretary-General's
good offices independently of the Council can help maintain inter-
national peace and security. Similarly, the Security Council is free
to pass resolutions which do not closely involve the Secretary-General.
But the two work best together, and there is scope for closer liaison
between them.
Finally, I turn again to peacekeeping. I have described how peace-
keeping came into being. Nineteen-Eighty-Eight was a spectacular
year. Apart from the award of the Nobel Peace Prize, 1988 saw the
creation of three new UN missions to preserve or maintainithe peace:
A UN monitoring force was established in Afghanistan following the
Soviet Union's decision to withdraw its forces; UN observers were
put in place following the agreement to a ceasefire in the Persian
Gulf; and a UN verification mission was established for Namibia
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following the agreements between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa.
In prospect for 1989 is a massive operation by the United Nations
to supervise the transition to independence in Namibia, possibly a
UN presence in the Western Sahara following the Secretary-General's
launch of a peace initiative last August, and possibly a UN monitoring
group in Central America. Let us not forget the five other peace-
keeping forces which have been in position for many years: in Cyprus,
in Lebanon, along the Golan Heights in Syria, in Jerusalem, and -
sometimes forgotten - the 37-strong force in Kashmir. Almost 500,000
military staff from 58 countries have at one time worn the UN blue
helmets. Seven hundred and thirty-three have lost their lives in UN
service. At present, some 10,000 troops and observers from 35 coun-
tries operate under the UN flag.
It is difficult to quantify the costs of peacekeeping, but they are
in the order of US$350 million per year. We believe it essential to
put such operations on a better financial and organizational footing.
At present, the United States is among those withholding their con-
tributions to the normal peacekeeping budget. The different budget
for the UN force in Cyprus, which is on a voluntary basis, is several
years in arrears. The burden falls heaviest on the troop contributors,
whose patience may not be inexhaustible, as Sweden's recent decision
to withdraw from the forces in Cyprus has shown.
The success of peacekeeping operations sometimes produces loose
thinking about the concept itself. We should, I think, distinguish
carefully between peace-making, peace-keeping, and peace-enforcing.
Within the United Nations peace-making is primarily the function of
the Secretary-General, naturally supported by the Security Council
and the international community generally. Peace-keeping we have
already discussed. It cannot be practiced in its present form without
the agreement of the parties between whom the peace is being kept.
An obvious hazard is that by interposing a peace-keeping force, an
intolerable status quo can thereby be preserved. There are dangers
of this happening in Cyprus. Paradoxically, peace-keeping forces can
therefore become one of the obstacles in reaching a solution.
Peace-enforcing is quite different. It implies the coercion of the
parties to keep the peace even against their will. The only time the
United Nations has done this was in the case of Korea, although it
came close to doing so in the Congo. UN experience there, including
the death of the Secretary-General, had the political effect of removing
peace-enforcing from the agenda. But it may not be off it forever.
Not long ago, the Russians showed interest in creating a peace-
enforcing naval force in the Persian Gulf, and they have shown
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interest in reviving the Military Staff Committee of the Security
Council. The time may not have come to look into ideas of this
kind; but in the future it is not inconceivable that situations might
arise in which the international community through the Security
Council might wish to act against some aberrant government possessed
perhaps of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, planning to
endanger world peace. There are some aberrant figures around al-
ready, from Pol Pot to Quaddafi, and noone has forgotten Hitler.
I conclude that the future of the Security Council as the instrument
for ensuring international peace and security is more promising and
interesting now than perhaps ever before in the history of the United
Nations. The value of diplomacy is self-evident. It is immeasurably
cheaper than the use of force. Some governments have still to reckon
for this in their internal accounting procedures. Perhaps, as one
eminent Russian once said to me, it would be best to send bills for
peace-keeping to Ministries of Defence rather than to Ministries of
Foreign Affairs.
The Security Council is a vital and certainly the most conspicuous
part of the machinery of the United Nations. The world has come
to seem a little place, and conflicts in one area can rapidly become
conflicts in another. We need the best controlling mechanism that
can be invented. The Security Council, like the world it is meant to
protect, is the only one that we have got.
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